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Casenotes
RIGHT OF ACTION OF A MINOR CHILD AGAINST
A PARENT TORT FEASOR
Mahnke v. Moore'
By MALCOLM L. JACOBSON*
On March 7, 1950, in Salisbury, Maryland, Russell C.
Moore, with a shotgun, murdered his mistress, Marjorie
Mahnke, in the presence of their five year old illegitimate
daughter. On March 13, after keeping her with the corpse
for one week, he took the child with him to his home in
New Jersey. There, again in the child's presence and again
with a shotgun, he committed suicide, causing her to be
spattered with his blood. The child, Marilyn Marie Mahnke,
by her grandfather - her guardian and next friend - then
brought suit against Laura Woodward Moore, her father's
widow and executrix, to recover for shock, mental anguish,
and permanent nervous and physical injuries caused by
Moore's atrocious acts. Defendant demurred to the declara-
tion, the demurrer was sustained, judgment was entered for
the defendant, and an appeal was taken by plaintiff to the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, where the judgment on the
demurrer was reversed and the child was allowed to sue.
Aside from the obvious human interest side of the case,
the Court was faced with two questions of major importance
in the law of Maryland. The first of these was whether the
minor child can sue her parent in tort at all. The second -
not to be taken up at this time - was whether, even if the
plaintiff could sue her parent, there was any tort committed
against her that she could sue for. The question to be taken
up here is the former, which, more fully stated, is, "May an
unemancipated minor child sue the parent for a personal
tort?" The answer given by the overwhelming weight of
authority is simply, "No". But the answer given by the
Maryland Court in the principal case was, "Yes". Here an
attempt will be made to review the reasons and background
of the majority view, as well as its application in the general
case law, the possible exceptions to this view, and, lastly,
the reasoning and effect of the principal case with its seem-
ingly contrary answer.
* Third Year Student, University of Maryland School of Law.
1 Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A. 2d 923 (Md. 1951).
MAHNKE v. MOORE
A. BACKGROUND AND GENRAL APPLICATIONS OF
THE RULE OF PARENTAL IAVEMUNITY
In the English Common Law, there was no such thing
as a parent's immunity from suit for torts committed by
him against his minor children. Most of the early cases
dealing with this question were decisions on the parent's
right of chastisement of the child. While the parent clearly
had such a right to correct or punish the child, the latter
was allowed to recover in a civil action from the parent for
abuse of the privilege. English text writers of the Nine-
teenth Century were unanimous as to this doctrine of allow-
ing suits against the parent.2
On this side of the water, the earliest mention of the
subject was in accord with the English view. In 1816, Judge
Reeve said that parents have the power to correct and
chastise their children moderately, but:
"... when the punishment is... unreasonable and
it appears that the parent acted.., from wicked mo-
tives, under the influence of an unsocial heart, he
ought to be liable in damages."3
However, by 1879, with no case law on which to base his
theories, Judge Cooley gave the first inkling in the United
States that the law was no longer as Judge Reeve had writ-
ten it. The gist of Cooley's commentary was that while
there was no principle or rule of Common Law why the
suit should not be allowed, to permit such a contest of
parental authority is so questionable that the action must
fail." A few years later, Professor Schouler made state-
ments to the same effect, but much more definitely and cer-
tainly. Admitting his lack of precedent, he says:
"With reference to a blood parent5 ... all such liti-
gation seems abhorrent to the idea of family discipline
2 AODISON, TORTS (4th Ed.) 727. POLLOCK, TORTS (12th Ed.) 128.
9 REEVE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1816) 287.
'COOLEY, TORTS (1879) 171.
'In Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S. W. 2d 245, 122 A. L. R. 1348 (1939),
the relationship of the parties was that of adoptive parent and adopted
child. The tort committed was an extreme one - the parent poisoned the
child - and clearly wilful and malicious. The court referred, p. 247, to its
previous decision in Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S. W. 2d 468 (1938),
saying:
"We therefore hold that an unemancipated minor may not maintain
an action for an involuntary tort against his parent in this State."
But it went on to say:
"The reason for announcing this rule was that such suits would dis-
turb the relationships of the family as a social unit as the members
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... and the privacy and mutual confidence which should
obtain in the household."'
He further advocates criminal penalties when necessary,
but shuns the civil liability, as stated."
This, then, was the state of American law on the point
when the case of Hewellette v. George came up in Mississ-
ippi, in 1891.8 The action there was by a minor child against
the parent in tort for wrongful confinement in an insane
asylum. The court, citing no authorities, not even the text-
writers, decided what was to become the leading American
case on the question of minor children suing parent tort-
feasors:
"So long as the parent is under obligation to care
for, guide, and control, and the child is under reciprocal
obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such action
as this can be maintained. The peace of society, and of
the families composing society, and a sound public
policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and
the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child
a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to
civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands
of the parent. The State, through its criminal laws,
will give the minor child protection from parental
violence and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can
be heard to demand."9
This was the rule, then, as it came into being. The reasons,
quickly, were public policy, family peace and tranquility,
and family discipline. The court was clearly influenced in
its decision by Schouler, however.'0
thereof are bound by the same blood and natural ties of affection....
In the instant case (there were an adoptive father and an adopted son.)
There was no blood relationship between -them. No natural ties of
affection existed between them."
Held, for plaintiff child. As to how much the court was influenced by the
extreme nature of the tort, there is no intimation in the opinion. Further,
the adoptive relationship and the family ties fostered by it, are generally
favored 'by the law. Yet here, the court used the adoptive status to reject
the family ties and allow the child to sue. Query: The illegitimate family
relationship is far weaker than the adoptive status, so why did not the
Maryland court, in the principal case, simply base its decision on the fact
that the child was illegitimate, within the doctrine of the Brown v. Cole
case? In this connection, see p. 219, infra. The answer might perhaps be
found once again in the extreme nature of the tort.
6 SoHouLm, DOMESTiC RELATIONS (3rd Ed.), Sec. 275.
'Ibid, Sec. 275.
868 Miss. 703, 9 S. 885 (1891).9 Ibid, 887.
10 See p. 203, 8upra.
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This case was followed by many others, on grounds
of public policy,1 of preserving domestic tranquility, 2 of
maintaining parental authority, 18 and of protecting the in-
tegrity and unity of the family. 4 In Roller v. Roller,5 the
father had been convicted in a criminal action for rape of
his minor daughter. The court, in dismissing her civil suit
and approving of domestic tranquility,' 6 stated its fear that
if it departed from the rule in an extreme case, there would
be no practical line of demarcation. This even though
the family harmony and other ties had been thoroughly
ruined. 7 This extreme is as far as the courts have gone in
striving to maintain the rule of immunity."5
In the face of decisions such as that just discussed, there
was bound to be a revolt eventually. It came about in 1930,
with the case of Dunlap v. Dunlap.9 The situation there
was of a minor son working for his father in the father's
factory, living at home but paying board, and being injured
in the factory while on the job. The father had liability
insurance protecting him against just such injuries to his
employees. The court there said:
"On its face, the rule is a harsh one. It denies pro-
tection to the weak upon the ground that in this [parent
and child] relation the administration of justice has
been committed to the strong and that authority must
be maintained. It should not be tolerated at all except
for very strong reasons; and it should never be extended
beyond the bounds compelled by those reasons,
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 664 (1903).
2Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 A. 198, 199 (1925), saying:
"Anything that brings the child Into conflict with the father or
diminishes the father's authority or hampers him in Its exercise is re-
pugnant to the family establishment, and is not to be countenanced .... "
Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929). For further cita-
tions, see PRossEm, ToRTs (1941) 905, notes 58, 59.
5 Supra, n. 12.
16 The court also said, supra, n. 12, 789:
"Outside of these reasons, which affect public policy, another reason,
which seems almost to be reductio ad absurdum, is that, if a child
should recover a judgment from a parent, In the event of Its death the
parent would become heir to the very property which had been wrested
by the law from him."
This ruling has been referred -to in PRossER, TORTS (1941), and McCurdy,
Torts Between Persons in Dome8tie Relations, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1063-4
(1930), but in each instance the Roller case was the sole case cited on
the point.
1C f. Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A. 2d 923 (Md. 1951), p. 219, infra.
" "It is deemed better that an occasional wrong should go unrequited
than that family life should be subjected to the disrupting effect of such
suits."
Securo v. Securo, 110W. Va. 1, 156 S. E. 750, 751 (1931).
"84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A. L. R. 1055 (1930).
1951]
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"Such immunity as the parent may have from suit
by the minor child for personal tort arises from a disa-
bility to sue, and not from lack of violated duty. This
disability is not absolute. It is imposed for the protec-
tion of family control and harmony, and exists only
where a suit or the prospect of a suit might disturb the
family relations. Stated from the viewpoint of the
parent, it is a privilege, but only a qualified one. It is
not an answer to a suit for an intentional injury, malici-
ously inflicted."20
But it is interesting to note that, in spite of all this, the
court finally based its decision on the facts of the emancipa-
tion2 of the son and the liability insurance22 held by the
father.23 Therefore, the entire discussion and conclusions
reached in the Dunlap case on the matter of overruling the
doctrine of parental immunity are merely dictum - strong
dictum to be sure - but still dictum. Thus, the case does
not actually overrule the tremendous weight of authority,
but merely comments on it and makes exception to it.
24
In Bulloch v. Bulloch,25 decided shortly after the Dunlap
case, there was an automobile accident due to the father's
negligence. No gross negligence was involved. The child
sued for injuries sustained. The suit was not allowed, but
in the course of the decision, the court said:
"...if the father should so violate his obligation as
to work a forfeiture of his right of control, as by cruelty
or otherwise, and the child sustains injury thereby,
may not the child maintain an action against the father
for the legal wrong thus committed?26 . . . We do not
hold that a father could not be held liable for a wil-
ful or malicious wrong, or for some act of cruelty
which operated at the same time to forfeit his parental
authority. ' '2 7
This case would seem to go much further than the Dunlap
case, but for the fact that in the state of this decision,
Georgia, there was a statute at the time saying that cruel
2Ibid, 909, 915. See B6, p. 215, infra, on Wilful Misconduct.
2See B3, p. 210, infra.
"See B5, p. 213, infra.
"Annotation to Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra, n. 19, 71 A. L. R. 1071.
24 See B6, p. 215, infra, on Wilful Misconduct. For the effect of Dunlap v.
Dunlap on the principal case, see C, p. 218 ff., infra.
"45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S. E. 708 (1932).
2Ibid, 712. Compare with the language of emancipation by cruelty, infra,
n. 48.
"Supra, n. 25, 711.
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treatment by the parent emancipated the child and pro-
vided a dividing line between parental liability and non-
liability. The Bulloch case is distinguishable on this ground.
The latest development of the rule of parental immunity
has come within the past few years. Beginning with a com-
ment in a New York case decided in 1949,28 echoing the
remark on wilful misconduct in Dunlap v. Dunlap," the
idea of a possible new exception to the rule in cases of wilful
torts began to arise. The culmination came in Cowgill v.
Boock,30 actually calling Hewellette v. George,"' cited above,
wrongly decided and resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
This case and its effect will be more fully discussed in the
next section on Possible Exceptions to the Rule, under the
subheading of Wilful Misconduct.
B. POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF PARENTAL
IMMuNTY FROM TORT Surr BY CHILDREN
Despite the almost slavish following of the rule of im-
munity in most jurisdictions, there are nevertheless certain
exceptions to it which are inherent in the very statement
of it. Added to these are further exceptions stated and
adopted by the Dunlap and Cowgill cases, cited above.
These exceptions will be discussed under the following
headings and in the following order:
1. Torts Affecting the Person and Torts Affecting
Property
2. Statutory Emancipation of Husband and Wife
3. Emancipation of the Child
4. Persons in Loco Parentis
5. Possession of Liability Insurance by the Parent
6. Wilful Misconduct3 2
1. Torts Affecting the Person and
Torts Affecting Property83
From the earliest days of the Common Law, although
the parent was given the legal custody of the child, the
I Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196 Misc. 551, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 595 (1949) ; aff'd 276
App. Div. 972, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 620 (1950).
m See quoted passage from that case, 8upra, pp. 205-6, n. 20. Also n. 73, infra.
o189 Or. 282, 218 P. 2d 445, 19 A. L. R. 2d 405 (1950).
mSupra, n. 8.
2 A possible further exception is bastardy. See n. 91, infra.
1What of ex contractu actions between parent and child? Most cases
concerning this problem deal with agreements, oral or written, between the
parties for compensation for services rendered to the parent by the child,
1951]
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latter was still a legal person entitled to own property,
receive the benefits from it, and sue to protect it. The suit
was either through his parent, or if the parent's interests
were adverse, through a guardian ad litem.84 There was
not even a suggestion of the immunity of a parent from
suits for torts against property. Of course, there was also
no immunity from suits for personal torts. Whether they
be thought good or bad, the two rules were at least con-
sistent. But, as already stated, the decision in Hewellette
v. George" did establish the newer rule of parental im-
munity from suits for personal torts, on grounds of domestic
tranquility. No mention was made in that case of actions
for torts against property. Thus, the inconsistency came
into being. One of the later cases explains it as follows:
"Since the minor may, through another, sue his
parent to recover property rights... are the property
rights of a minor of more importance to him than the
rights of his person? No; but their protection will not
disturb the family relation as will the action for per-
sonal injuries..."I'
We have then the first real exception to the rule of im-
munity: it applies only to personal torts and not to torts
affecting the property of the child. 7
and they hold that if such a contract can be proven, it may be enforced.
The action is allowed. However, there Is no right to such compensation in
the absence of a valid agreement, unless it can be shown that payment was
contemplated by both parties. 67 C. J. S. 735, citing Scripps v. Scripps,
40 F. 2d 176 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930), cert. den. 282 U. S. 866; Meers v. Potter,
208 Ark. 965, 188 S. W. 2d 500 (1945). Also, see Annotation to Re Fox's
Estate, 131 W. Va. 429, 48 S. E. 2d 1, 7 A. L. R. 2d 1, 8 (1948), entitled
Recovery for Services Rendered by Member of Household or Family other
than Spouse without Express Agreement for Compensation.
, PRossSE, TORTS (1941), 905.
Supra, ns. 8, 9.
Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753, 755 (1929).
8' While there are comparatively few cases on this point, the writers all
agree that this is the law: 67 C. J. S. 787, n. 94, citing Small v. Morrison,
185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 31 A. L. R. 1135 (1923) ; 39 Am. Jur. 734, n. 3,
citing Segall v. Ohio Casualty Co., 224 Wis. 379, 272 N. W. 665, 110 A. L. R.
82 (1937) ; McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv.
L. Rev. 1030, 1058 (1930), citing Myers v. Myers, 47 W. Va. 487, 35 S. E.
868 (1900).
As a matter of analogy, it may be noted that such suits for torts against
property are also allowed between husband and wife, even while they too
are immune from suits in tort by each other. See, B2, infra, Statutory
Emancipation of Husband and Wife, p. 209. In Cochrane v. Cochrane,
139 Md. 530, 532, 115 A. 811 (1921), it was said: ". . . either the husband or
wife can sue the other in equity for protection of his or her property."
Wilson v. Wilson, 86 Md. 638, 39 A. 276 (1898) : ". . . as, under the Code,
the wife is vested with the legal title to her separate estate, she can main-
tain an action for the recovery, security, or protection of her property."
Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 214 (1870), (and other cases cited).
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2. Statutory Emancipation of
Husband and Wife
With the coming of the Married Women's Acts 8 in this
country, a new problem arose: does the emancipation of
husband and wife, removing the wife's disability to sue or
be sued without joinder of her husband (and in some States
even allowing her to sue her husband), have any effect on
the parent and child relationship, allowing the child to sue
his parent?
In order to answer this, it must first be stated that these
emancipation statutes apply expressly to husband and wife
only. There seems to be no legislation in any state on the
emancipation between parent and child. H a
The reasons for the earlier rule of disability were two-
fold: the legal unity existing between husband and wife,
and the arguments for domestic tranquility. As to the first
of these, Sir Frederick Pollock warns that the legal unity
of husband and wife does not apply between parent and
child."9 This view was followed by Professor McCurdy
when he said that there is no conception of unity of legal
identity of parent and child.40 This has been the generally
accepted view with the exception of a comment in Mesite
v. Kirchstein, suggesting such unity.4 Under the authori-
ties, therefore, they are two entirely different legal concep-
Md. Code (1939), Art. 45, Secs. 4, 5.
See, however, Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A. 2d 461 (1939), decided
under the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Statute. This law provided that:
"... the persons entitled to recover damages for any injuries causing
death shall be the husband, widow, children, or parent of the deceased."
The suit was by a minor child, by his next friend, against his mother
for negligence causing his father's death. The court said:
"The legislation clearly states that the minor shall share in the com-
pensation payable by one whose negligence caused his parent's death....
The legislature made no exceptions . . . to the effect that the child shall
be deprived of the benefit of the statute when the surviving parent is
the ,tortfeasor, or if the suit conflicts with a rule at times theretofore
prohibiting suits disruptive of the family relation .... The legislation
was a declaration of public policy on the subject and necessarily dis-
placed any policy to the contrary, if, in fact, it existed."
This was a 4-3 decision, with one concurring Justice saying the suit was to
recover for a "property loss", hence the rule against parent-child tort suits
did not apply, and the dissent saying the statute was not intended to change
the public policy of Pennsylvania protecting family relations, but to be
subservient thereto.
The section of the Maryland Code on Wrongful Death is Md. Code (1939),
Art. 67, Sec. 3, providing that the State shall bring the action in the name
of and for the benefit of ". . . the wife, husband, parent and child of the
person whose death shall have been so caused .. "
9 POLLOCK, TouTs (12th Ed.), 128.
40 McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1030, 1056-1082 (1930).
'1 See note 36, supra.
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tions. The destruction of the legal unity of husband and
wife has no effect whatever on the parental immunity from
the child's tort suits.
What then of the domestic tranquility arguments? The
supreme court of Wisconsin has said:
"While it may be conceded.., that the decision [of
husband's civil liability to wife] 42 . . . (made necessary
by statute) mars somewhat the symmetry and beauty
of the family conception, it does not destroy it, and this
court is not disposed to impair it further than is neces-
sary to carry out apparent legislative policies."48
In other words, the emancipation statutes do affect domestic
tranquility so far as they go, but the courts absolutely
refuse to carry them to the parent and child relationship by
implication. Some cases simply say:
".... there has been no such legislation in reference
to the case of parent and child, and therefore the prin-
ciple of the common law which forbade the mainte-
nance of any such action as between them should still
be allowed to prevail."'44
Briefly, then, the Married Women's Acts have no effect
on the rule as stated.
3. Emancipation of the Child
Corpus Juris Secundum, in speaking of the rule of pa-
rental immunity, is always careful to say that an unemanci-
pated child cannot sue its parent in tort. The questions now
to be taken up are: what is emancipation as used here, how
does it occur, and how does it affect the child's right to sue
his parent?
The law imposes upon minor children a certain bondage.
They owe to their parents duties of obedience and obliga-
" The Maryland Statute, 8upra, note 38, has no such effect. By its lan-
guage It allows a wife to sue and be sued during coverture the same as if
she were unmarried. But this has been construed as having no effect what-
ever on the wife's lack of capacity ,to sue her husband in tort.
In Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927), the wife
sued her husband for her injuries received due to his negligence in driving
his car while she was a passenger. The court cited and quoted extensively
from Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (1910), refusing to allow a tort
action between husband and wife under a similar statute, and said, p. 252:
"The intention to create, as between husband and wife, personal
causes of action, which did not exist before the Act, is not, in our
opinion, expressed by [the Statute's] terms."
Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, 788 (1927).
"Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 31 A. L. R. 1135 (1923);
p. 17, cone. op.
[VOL. XlI
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tions to render services. These duties may be classed
among the disabilities of being a minor, and emancipation
as used here means the removal of one or more of thesedisabilities."
This removal may be brought about in several different
ways, and either parent or child may precipitate it. The
various ways of emancipating children have been classified
as follows:"'
a. The parent expressly or impliedly emancipates his
child by written or oral agreement or merely by
some act denoting a relinquishment of parental
control."'
b. By misconduct of the parent, such as abandon-
ment, cruelty, or neglect."'
c. By marriage of the infant, whether or not by pa-
rental consent, so long as a valid marriage is en-
tered into.
d. By the mere passage of time, such as when the
child either reaches full majority (21 years, gen-
erally) or reaches an age when by statutory au-
thority he is allowed to exercise some of the rights
of majority. 9
5 1 'Emancipation', as the term is used in the law of parent and child,
means the freeing of the child from the custody of the parent and from
the obligation to render services to him."
67 C. J. S. 811.
"Note, Emancipation of Infant by Parent's Cruelty for Purposes of Con-
trol Over Earnings and Services, 8 Md. L. Rev. 71, 73, noting Lucas v. Mary-
land Drydock Co., 182 Md. 54,31 A. 2d 637 (1943).
' See 46 C. J. 1343 and 67 C. J. S. 813.
, "The law implies emancipation where a father who is able to support
his minor son forces him to leave home and labor abroad for a liveli-
hood. The same is true where the parent becomes so degraded and dis-
solute that the child could not in morals or decency live with him.
Emancipation is also implied by the abandonment or desertion of a
minor child."
67 C. J. S. 815.
"A further question arises as to whether a child, once emancipated by
either coming of age or other means, may sue his parent for a tort occurring
before emancipation, during the period of disability. This is answered In
19 A. L. R. 2d 405, 438, in the Annotation on Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282,
218 P. 2d 445 (1950), where It is said:
"An emancipated child cannot maintain an action against his parent
for a tort committed before emancipation if at the time of the wrong
the action was not maintainable",
citing Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N. J. L. 532, 181 A. 153 (1935), and Rambo
v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S. W. 2d 468 (1938).
In accord Is 67 C. J. S. 789, saying:
"... the child may not, even after reaching majority, maintain an
action for a tort committed by the parent while the child was an un-
emancipated minor."
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c. During, but only during, military service while
still a minor.
These are the ways in which emancipation comes about,
but what is it's effect? Emancipation removes the child's
disability to sue his parent in tort, among other things.
Therefore, generally, whenever a minor wishes to so sue
his parent, the first thing he must prove is his emancipa-
tion, the burden of which is naturally on him as plaintiff."
A clearer insight into emancipation and its application
may be gotten from looking at Dunlap v. Dunlap,5 previ-
ously referred to. In that case, the minor son worked for
his father in the latter's factory, and as to this employment
they dealt as strangers. The son received a regular work-
man's pay, which was not a mere gratuity paid to a child
for services legally due the parent. Since he still lived at
home, the child's room and board were taken into account
in the fixing of his salary. After considering all this, the
court there said that the son had been emancipated by the
father's acts, which would fall into group "a" in the listing
above. The test of emancipation is. the preservation or
destruction of the parental relation,52 and depends to a large
extent on the parental intent in acting.5" In the Dunlap
case, the father's acts clearly showed his intent to release
his parental control and treat his son as a stranger.54 By
doing this, the father's defense of immunity from suit in
tort was taken away and he became liable to such suit by
his minor child.55 This is not part of the dictum of the
This is in agreement with the principle of the law of husband and wife
which says that:
"Where husband and wife are not liable to each other for torts com-
mitted by one against the other during coverture, they do not, upon
being divorced, become liable to each other for torts committed prior
to the divorce, by one spouse on the person or character of the other
during coverture. . . . The divorce cannot in itself create a cause of
action in favor of the wife upon which she may sue, where it was not a
cause of action before the divorce." 27 Am. Jur. 196-197.
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A. L. R. 1055 (1930).
51 Ibid.
52 Carthage v. Canton, 97 Me. 473, 54 A. 1104 (1903).
Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763 (1908).
"The present suit Is [for a negligent wrong], growing out of the rela-
tion of master and servant. As to this employment, the father had in-
tentionally surrendered his parental control. . . . The son could not
intimidate him by threat of suit, nor would family discord result from
a prosecution of the son's claim." Supra, n. 50, 911, 912.
Where the parent does not claim the services of the child because of the
filial relationship, but contracts for them under an agreement entered into
between them as strangers, such an agreement necessarily Implies emanci-
pation. Merithew v. Ellis, 116 Me. 468, 102 A. 301, 2 A. L. R. 1429 (1917).




Dunlap case, but is one of the two major grounds for that
decision.
Therefore, emancipation of the child, by whatever
means, is the second exception to the general rule of pa-
rental immunity.
4. Persons in Loco Parentis
As to persons in loco parentis - teachers, relatives with
whom the child is living, et cetera6 - there is some dis-
pute. Most of the suits by minor children against such
defendants have been for some type of deliberate or mali-
cious wrong or cruel or inhuman treatment,57 and while
the decisions reached are all the same, different reasons are
given for them.
Most of the cases simply allow the action and give n-
really apparent reasons.5s They form the weight of authol -
ity on the point. The minority cases say that one in loco
parentis has full parental immunity, except in cases of
wilful injuries.59 Since the assumption is that one in loco
parentis is in the same position legally as a natural parent,
it would seem that this minority is the more forward-
looking law and consistent with the recent trend of de-
cisions on the point.60 But whatever the reasons given, the
action is still allowed, making those in loco parentis the
third exception to the rule of parental immunity.
5. Possession of Liability Insurance
by the Parent
The problem presented here is: where the parent carries
liability insurance to cover just such suits as the child is
bringing, should the child be allowed to sue? The question
is a fairly recent one, coming to the attention of the courts
more often of late because of the prevalence of liability
insurance held by the defendants in cases of injuries in-
flicted through the negligent operation of motor vehicles,
and the answer is far from being settled.
The weight of authority, having adopted its rule of pa-
rental immunity, stands by it and holds that insurance
has no effect on the right of action. Their rule has been
stated as:
51See note 5, 8upra, discussing the relationship of child with adoptive
parent.
6739 Am. Jur. 735.
5PRoSSER, TORTS (1941), 906.
Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901).
® "It Is doubtful whether such suits could be maintained for ordinary
negligence." Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N. J. L. 532, 181 A. 153 (1935).
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A child may not maintain an action against a parent
for personal injuries resulting from the negligent oper-
ation of a motor vehicle, simply because the parent
may or does carry liability insurance."
The reasons underlying this rule are threefold: the danger
of collusion between the injured and the insured, increased
because of the family relation;62 that there is no right of
action without insurance, and so the existence of liability
insurance ought not to be allowed to create a cause of action
where none exists otherwise;"3 and, lastly, the arguments
for domestic tranquility:
"No greater disservice could be rendered to any
child than to teach its feet to stray from the path of
rectitude, or to suffer its mind to be poisoned by ideas
of disloyalty and dishonor."'64
In Mesite v. Kirchstein,65 however, there was a hint of
coming things:
"When compulsory insurance in automobile cases
is required, and the legislative enactment provides that
recovery can be had directly from an insurer by one
injured through the negligence of the insured, the child
might recover of the insurer for the negligent injury
inflicted by his parent."6 6 [Italics added.]
This suggestion that the insurer, who was the real party
in interest, could be sued in certain instances for recovery
because of the parent's tort would seem to lead logically to
the question of whether the parent might himself be sued
under the same or similar circumstances. This question
was taken up in the Dunlap case and its answer was made
the second of the grounds for the decision there. Briefly,
the New Hampshire court said that the child cannot be
denied the right to sue his parent for tort because of the
effect on discipline and family life, where the father's
liability insurance avoided such effect.
Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753 (1929) ; Villaret v. Vil-
laret, 169 F. 2d 677 (D. C. Ct. Ap. 1948), applying Maryland law: Schneider
v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498, 72 A. L. R. 449 (1930), n. 87, infra.
2 PaossEm, TORTS (1941), 908, and cases there cited.
08Ibid.
Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 15, 31 A. L. R. 1135 (1923).
Supra, n. 61.
Supra, n. 61, 755.
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".... the essential fact which establishes the suability
of the father is that he has provided for satisfying the
judgment in some way which removes the suit from
the class promotive of family discord .... The defense
being based upon the proposition that there will be
family trouble because of the adversary state of mind
between parent and child, created by the prospective
gain to the child at the expense of the parent, anything
which shows that, to the knowledge of the parties,
there is no substantial prospect of such loss, destroys
the foundation for the defense."'67
Or, as was said in a later case in accord where the father
was insured:
"... when the reason for a rule ceases, the rule itself
ceases."68
As to the danger of collusion and fraud between the
members of a family, the Dunlap case disposes of that by
saying:
"Experience in the matter is perhaps still too limited
to furnish reliable proof; yet the fact that there appear
to have been no suits, save for malicious injuries, be-
fore insurance was known and used, coupled with the
recent institution of actions for negligence where there
is insurance, points with reasonable certainty to the
answer to the prophecies of untoward results to follow
any holding that the parent is accountable to the child.
It shows that suits which would harass the parent,
impair his authority, and disrupt the home, are not
likely to be brought."69
However, regardless of the seeming good sense of the
Dunlap view in general, the majority of cases are still of
the opinion that liability insurance makes no exception to
the rule of immunity.
6. Wilful Misconduct
This last section is perhaps the most far reaching of the
exceptions to the rule of parental immunity. In its most
extreme manifestation, it ceases to be an exception alto-
" Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905, 913, 914, 71 A. L. R.
1055 (1930).
6Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538, 539 (1932).
0 Supra, n. 67, 914.
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gether and becomes rather an express modification of the
rule.7" In order to trace the full development of this point,
it is necessary to discuss briefly the cases leading up to it.
The first cases to hold that wilful misconduct was an ex-
ception to the rule all dealt with persons in loco parentis.7
A few of these decided squarely that those in loco parentis
had full parental immunity, except in cases of wilful mis-
conduct.2 Outside of a comment in Dunlap v. Dunlap,7 3
however, the courts were slow to extend this doctrine to
cases of natural parents. American Jurisprudence com-
ments upon this and suggests a remedy:
"Whether a natural parent, as distinguished from
one in loco parentis,"' may be sued by a child for a
malicious or intentional act or for cruel and inhuman
treatment is a question upon which there seems to be
very little authority. On principle it would seem that
the courts ought to recognize a cause of action of this
kind. This might be done, without disturbing the gen-
eral rule, upon the ground that the parent, by his wilful
or malicious act or cruel treatment, forfeits his pa-
rental privileges and authority, including his immunity
from suit by the child."7
This statement adopts the language and doctrine of emanci-
pation by cruelty,76 and thus, instead of making a new ex-
ception which the courts might hesitate to allow," merely
makes the wilful misconduct "exception" an offshoot of the
doctrine of emancipation.
The law remained in this state until 1949, when the
Appellate Division of New York, in Meyer v. Ritterbush7
said by way of dictum that an unemancipated child can-
not ordinarily sue for negligence, but may where wilful
misconduct exists. The "un-" of unemancipated should be
" Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P. 2d 445, 19 A. L. R. 2d 405 (1950).
7See B4, p. 213, supra.
12 Treschman v. Treschman, supra, n. 59.
73 Supra, n. 67, 915:
"[Parental immunity] is not an answer to a suit for an intentional
injury, maliciously inflicted."
In Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S. E. 708 (1932), discussed on
page 206, supra, there was language of similar import used, but as has
already been said, In that case there was an emancipation statute in exist-
ence covering the problem.
" Recognizing Treschman v. Treschman, supra, n. 59.
1539 Am. Jur. 737. Cf. Mahnke v. Moore, 77 A. 2d 923 (Md. 1951), the
principal case, page 219 ff., infra.
See B3, p. 210, 8upra, on Emancipation of the Child.
" Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905), page 205, n. 15, supra.
71196 Misc. 551, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 595 (1949) ; aff'd. 276 App. Div. 972, 94
N. Y. S. 2d 620 (1950).
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stressed, because by that syllable the court expressly repu-
diates emancipation as a basis for its decision, and creates
something new in the law of natural parent and child.
The first square decision affirming Meyer v. Ritterbush
was the case of Cowgill v. Boock, decided in 1950.11 The
facts of that case, briefly summarized, were as follows: The
father, a lumberjack, while drunk, and against the advice
of his friends, ordered his minor son into his car. The boy
went, against his will, and the father drove away. While
on the road home, the car plunged off a bank into a stream,
killing both father and son. When the wreck was found, the
father's body was still behind the wheel. The son's per-
sonal representatives then sued the father's estate.
The opinion of the court ° makes a brief allusion to
emancipation:
"The wrongful conduct of the father in driving the
automobile while drunk is in no way referable to his
duties as a parent. Indeed, in this case there was a
clear abandonment of the parental duty."'"
But it does not stop at this point. It goes on to call Hewel-
lette v. George,82 the leading case on parental immunity,
wrongly decided and resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
And it concludes by saying:
"After a careful consideration of the authorities, we
think the general rule ... should be modified to allow
an unemancipated minor child to maintain an action
for damages against his parent for a wilful or malicious
personal tort.... Ordinary negligence or the doing of
an unintentional wrong cannot be the basis for such an
action. To apply a hard and fast rule of nonliability
to the facts in this case would, in our opinion, defeat
justice and not subserve a sound public policy.". ... By
the wrongful conduct of the father in overstepping the
bounds of the family relationship, the peace, security
and tranquility of the home had already been disrupted.
When the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself
ceases." 4 [Italics added.]
Supra, n. 70.
10 With three judges dissenting, see n. 86, infra.81Supra, n. 70, 450.
12 68 Miss. 703, 9 S. 885 (1903).
"It is interesting to note that Cowgill v. Boock, in attempting to over-
rule Hewellette v. George, gives the same reason for its decision - public
policy - as that earlier case, and has the same dearth of authority.
8Supra, n. 70, 453. Cf. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905),
page 205, n. 15, supra, where the father was being sued for the rape of his
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The court here, in the italicized passage, suggests what
the "something new" in the Meyer v. Ritterbush case is -
not so much a new exception to the old rule, but a new
rule altogether. Perhaps this new version would read, "An
unemancipated minor child is only barred from suing his
parents for torts involving mere negligence, and nothing
more."8 5 However, it remains for future decisions to con-
strue the doctrines of Meyer v. Ritterbush and Cowgill v.
Boock before it can be decided whether they are to become
the new law of the land or only minority voices heard in
the wilderness.86
C. APPLICATION OF THE RuLE OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY
IN THE LAw OF MARYLAND
In this State, before the principal case, there were no
square decisions on the rule. The first mention of the
problem came up in Schneider v. Schneider, decided in
1930.7 There, the suit was by the parent against the child
for negligence. The Court merely mentioned the weight of
authority and the Dunlap case and said that they did not
apply in the case at bar. But there was involved the ques-
minor daughter, and the suit was not allowed. Also, Damiano v. Damiano,
6 N. J. Misc. 849, 143 A. 3 (1928), where the action was denied even though
both parent and child were dead.
In Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N. W. 33, 35 (1940), the parent
had died and the child was suing the estate in tort. The court said:
"To deny an unemancipated child the right to sue his living parent
for the latter's negligence and to grant him the right -to maintain such
an action against the parent's estate or his administrator, in case the
parent dies, should not, in our opinion, be permitted, in the absence of
a statute authorizing such an action."
However, in Cowgill v. Boock, supra, n. 70, the parent and child were
both dead, as in Damiano v. Damiano, above, and the action was allowed
without question on this point.8 "The strong modern inclination ... is to regard the minor's damage
action against parent or person in loco parentis as maintainable where
the injury or death was intentional or resulted from wilful misconduct
or an evil mind .... whether or not characterized as malice."
Annotation to Cowgill v. Boock, 19 A. L. R. 2d 405, 451, citing the principal
case of Mahnke v. Moore.
8 The dissent in Cowgill v. Boock, supra, n. 70, argues the old rule of
immunity and claims there is no logical 'basis for taking the case out of it.
It says, p. 459:
"No decision is cited by the majority for the view that the test for
determining liability or nonliability in this class of cases is whether the
tort is 'wilful' - which is a different thing from 'malicious',"
and concludes that although the father was wilful, he was not malicious,
and no exception should thus be made.
This implies that even the dissent would agree on allowing suit for
maliciously inflicted injuries in a proper case, but not for simply wilfully
negligent actions resulting in torts.
W 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498, 72 A. L. R. 449 (1930).
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tion of liability insurance, which the Court disposed of
with one sentence:
"The suit is not one on a policy, and the possession
of a policy by defendants could not affect the disposi-
tion of this case."88
Thus, Maryland was and still is lined up with the majority
of states in rejecting the insurance exception to the rule
of immunity.
The rule was mentioned expressly in Yost v. Yost, de-
cided in 1937.89 In a suit to force an estranged father to
increase his allotments for the support of his child, the
Court said that a parent is not liable to a child for his act of
passive negligence (non-feasance) incident to the parental
relation. The reasons given were "public policy" and the
"peace and harmony of the home", citing Dunlap v. Dunlap
and Mesite v. Kirchstein, both discussed, supra. It is true
that this decision was only in a suit for passive negligence,
but there was no reason to believe that the Court would not
have followed the weight of authority all the way, until
recently, except perhaps the phrase "incident to the pa-
rental relation", which hinted at a liability if the act was
not so incident.
We say "until recently" because of the principal case of
Mahnke v. Moore," involving an action by an illegitimate
minor child against her father's estate, to recover for per-
sonal injuries caused by atrocious acts committed by her
father in her presence. In holding that the demurrer was
improperly sustained, the Court of Appeals recognized the
right of a minor child to sue her parent in tort. For the
present, this discussion will be limited to the ground for
the demurrer, which is the parent's immunity from suit
by the child.
As to this problem, the Court was faced with a dilemma.
It could attack the case on either of two grounds: that of
the illegitimate child vs. father, or that of gross or malicious
misconduct vs. mere negligence. In the first of these, the
Court could simply have said that in such a situation the
rule of immunity does not apply, and thus made a new ex-
ception to it for illegitimate relationships. But this was
not done. The decision expressly says that:
i... we are treating the father as if he were a legiti-
mate parent and are holding that he has no immunity
- Ibid, 24.
172 Md. 128, 190 A. 753 (1937).
- 77 A. 2d 923 (Md. 1951).
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from this suit. We have no occasion now to decide
whether under other circumstances the father of an
illegitimate child would have any immunity at all
against a suit by such child." '91
The decision was put, therefore, on a gross misconduct basis.
The opinion, by Judge Delaplaine, discussed and cited
the doctrines of past authorities on this point, and then
went on to say:
"It is conceded,.., that parental authority should
be maintained. It is also conceded that a child should
forego any recovery or damages if such recovery would
unduly impair discipline and destroy the harmony of
the family. [But these reasons do not now apply] for
the simple reason that [here] there is no home at all in
which discipline and tranquility are to be preserved."92
This is the negative reason for the decision, and if
allowed to stand for itself would seem to lean toward the
newer, more liberal rule of Cowgill v. Boock, discussed
above. But the affirmative reason for the result reached -
and its real basis - was stated thusly:
2 Ibid, 926. There is a surprising dearth of law on this point, the only
case being a Puerto Rican decision, Garcia v. Fantauzzi, 20 F. 2d 524
(C. C. A. 1st, 1927). This was an action for civil damages. Plaintiff was
an illegitimate child, a "natural child" within the Puerto Rican Civil Code.
The Code gave such child the right "to be supported" by his father. The
court construed this as meaning that a natural child has "a legal (statutory)
right to support by the father", and admitted that "the rights of a natural
child under the law of Puerto Rico are much greater than the rights of a
bastard at common law".
The court said that this was not a suit "by a child living in the family,
against the father. It is a suit to recover damages based on defendant's
fraudulent avoidance of his statutory duty to support and educate. .... "
Up to this point, the decision was distinguishable as being based solely on
the statute, but it was further said, p. 528:
"We do not overlook the doctrine of such cases as Roller v. Roller,
37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) ; McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388,
77 S. W. 664, 64 L. R. A. 991 (1903) ; etc. These cases hold it contrary
to public policy to permit a minor child, living in the family, to sue a
parent In tort for damages .... We concur In the view . . . that the
public policy favoring family unity cannot be invoked to defeat a claim
for damages arising out of a breach by the defendant of every obligation
arising from the limited family relationship Imposed by the statutes of
Puerto Rico on the father of a natural child'. . . . Certainly it is not a
doctrine which should be extended to cover a case of a natural child
treated as, on the record, this plaintiff was treated by his father."
This last sentence could perhaps be considered as meaning that an illegiti-
mate child could sue his parent in -tort, but in the light of the heavy depend-
ance of the rest of the decision on the statute, It Is unlikely. As it is,
there are no decisions construing this case, so it must stand alone for what
it is worth.
9 Supra, n. 90, 926. Parenthetical material added. Cf. n. 84, 8upra.
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"... when . .. the parent is guilty of acts which
show complete abandonment of the parental relation,
the rule giving him immunity . . . cannot logically be
applied, for when he is guilty of such acts he forfeits
his parental authority and privileges, including his im-
munity from suit. '93
This will possibly sound familiar because it simply para-
phrases a similar passage in American Jurisprudence re-
ferred to previously,94 and, like that passage, speaks exclu-
sively the language of emancipation by parental miscon-
duct,95 without the word "emancipation" being used. In the
light of this statement, the Court's next pronouncement
loses some of its radical flavor:
"Justice demands that a minor child shall have a
right of action against a parent for injuries resulting
from cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious
and wanton wrongs." 0
When read out of context, this statement would seem to be
within the doctrine of Cowgill v. Boock, that the parent is
only immune from suits for negligent torts, but in the text
of the decision, it implies nothing more than that such acts
emancipate the child and so allow him to sue - a far cry
from Cowgill v. Boock and not at all revoluntionary in
the law. 7
" Supra, n. 90, 926. A few writers have adopted this language of Mahnke
v. Moore and its counterpart. See 39 Am. Jur. 737. In 64 Harv. L. Rev.
1208 (1951), noting Mahnke v. Moore, the principal case, entitled, Parent
and Child - Torts between Parent and Child - Unemaneipated Minor has
Cause of Action for Acts Constituting an Abandonment of the Parental
Relation, it was said that:
"Although In most instances this rule [of parental immunity] is un-
doubtedly desirable, its protection of the wantonly malicious parent has
led to the suggestion of a modification . . . which grants the parent a
privilege coincident with the 'conduct of the domestic establishment'
and -the training of the child, while imposing civil liability for wrongs
Inflicted outside the scope of these activities."
In the Annotation to Cowgill v. Boock, 19 A. L. R. 2d 405, 429, it was
said that:
"A parent guilty of wilful misconduct may be regarded as having
abandoned his parental role and any protection from civil liability
referable to it."
These writings lead to a somewhat confused situation, as to whether the
decision in the principal case was really based on emancipation, after all.
They seem to regard this "abandonment of the parental relationship" as a
separate entity in itself rather than a development of the law of emancipa-
tion, as contended in the body of this note.
Supra, n. 75.
See B3, B6, pp. 210, 215, 8upra.
Supra, n. 90, 926.
It should be noted that even In the statement last quoted, the Court
restricted Itself to "malicious and wanton wrongs". Therefore, even if that
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What then is the effect of Mahnke v. Moore on the Mary-
land law of Parent and Child? First of all, the case does
not even say that, in general, an illegitimate child can sue
his or her father. As already stated, the Court said that
they treated the father here as if he were the legitimate
parent, and went on to say:
"We have no occasion now to decide whether under
other circumstances the father of an illegitimate child
would have any immunity at all against a suit by such
child.""8 [Italics added.]
Thus, on the problem of illegitimate child vs. parent, the
case decides nothing.99
As to the problem of gross or malicious misconduct vs.
mere negligence, the Court of Appeals at best simply does
what the Washington Supreme Court refused to do in
Roller v. Roller"' - it makes an exception in an extreme
case. It does not say that a child cannot sue his parent in
tort except for wilful or malicious injuries; nor does it say
that a child is only barred from suit for negligent injuries.
It says one thing only, that in strictly limited circumstances
such as are present in the Mahnke case, the parent forfeits
his immunity from suit along with his other privileges of
parental authority - emancipation of the child. This con-
clusion is supported by the fact that Cowgill v. Boock and
the liberal view expressed in that case were cited to the
Court in the Appellant's brief on appeal, but were ignored
completely in the decision as finally written and handed
down. This obviously shows that the Court intentionally
refused to extend the case at bar beyond the point necessi-
tated by the facts. The only effect the principal case has
on the law of Maryland is to introduce into it the doctrine
of emancipation by parental cruelty, and it must be recog-
nized as being restricted to that effect only.
statement were held to be the law of the case, which it is not, it would still
not be within Cowgill v. Boock, which allowed suit for "wilful or malicious"
personal torts. It would perhaps be more in line with the dissent in the
Cowgill case, n. 86, supra.
Supra, n. 90, 926.
See note 91, 8upra, discussing this point.
11 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905), page 205, n. 15, supra.
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